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Abstract 
A myriad of policy issues and questions revolve around understanding the bioeconomy. 
To gain insight, we develop a stochastic and dynamic general equilibrium model and 
capture the uncertain nature of key variables such as crude oil prices and commodity 
yields. We also incorporate acreage limitations on key feedstocks such as corn, soybeans, 
and switchgrass. We make standard assumptions that investors are rational and engage in 
biofuel production only if returns exceed what they can expect to earn from alternative 
investments. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 mandates the use of 36 
billion gallons of biofuels by 2022, with significant requirements for cellulosic biofuel 
and biodiesel production. We calculate the level of tax credits required to stimulate this 
level of production. Subsidies of nearly $2.50 per gallon to biodiesel and $1.86 per gallon 
to cellulosic biofuel were required, and long-run equilibrium commodity prices were 
high, with corn at $4.76 per bushel and soybeans at $13.01 per bushel. High commodity 
prices are due to intense competition for planted acres among the commodities.  
 
Keywords: biodiesel, biofuels, cellulosic, dynamic, ethanol, general equilibrium  
Monte Carlo, market.  
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CROP-BASED BIOFUEL PRODUCTION UNDER ACREAGE 
CONSTRAINTS AND UNCERTAINTY 
 
 
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) was signed into law in 
December 2007. This act mandates the use of 36 billion gallons of biofuels by 2022, of 
which 15 billion gallons must come from corn-based ethanol and 21 billion from 
advanced biofuels, including 1 billion gallons of biomass-based diesel and 16 billion 
gallons of cellulosic biofuels. This new mandate means a significant increase in current 
biofuel production levels. Corn-based ethanol production was 1.63 billion gallons in 
2000, and by the end of 2007 production reached 7.23 billion gallons (see 
http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/statistics/). This increase in corn ethanol production 
has led to record high nominal corn prices in 2008. Competition for acreage has 
transferred some of the demand pressure experienced in corn markets to soybean and hay 
markets; the prices of these commodities have increased substantially as well.  
EISA does not specify how the mandates are to be met but states that “the 
Administrator shall promulgate rules establishing the applicable volumes…no later than 
fourteen months before the first year for which the applicable volumes will apply.” These 
mandates, and the methods used to ensure that they are met, will have a profound impact 
on agricultural markets and agricultural land use patterns in the United States.  
In theory, the administrator could simply require that fuel companies blend these 
quantities even if they are selling the end product at a loss. Or, the administrator could 
mandate the production of the biofuels even if produced at a loss, although the legal 
mechanism by which production would be forced is unknown. It seems far more likely, 
however, that the mandates will be met using taxes and/or subsidies. The purpose of this 
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study is to examine the incentives needed to ensure these mandates are met, and to 
project the impact of these incentives on U.S. agriculture. 
The model we present is based on the assumption that decisions influencing 
biofuel production can be predicted if one understands the optimal decisions of rational 
agents in the economy. Farmers will make rational planting decisions based on expected 
market prices and rotational constraints. Further, they will recognize that land used to 
produce the raw material for biofuels has an opportunity cost. Investors who build biofuel 
plants will do so only if they can expect a risk-adjusted return at a par with or superior to 
investments made elsewhere in the economy.  
In this study we take each of the key decisions just described and use parameters 
and data from the literature to model the decision and the market forces guiding the 
decision. The resulting sub-models are then combined within a rational, dynamic, 
stochastic general equilibrium model of U.S. crop and biofuel markets that is calibrated 
to reflect actual market conditions as of December 2007. We wish to evaluate the likely 
response of market participants to changes in incentives such as exogenous shocks to 
crude oil prices and biofuel credits and subsidies.  
Previous Literature 
Rozakis and Sourie (2005) develop a partial equilibrium linear programming model of 
the French biofuels sector. Their goal is to make policy suggestions regarding the 
efficient allocation of land to bioenergy crops and efficient tax exemptions. Zhang, 
Vedenov, and Wetzstein (2007) develop a structural vector autoregressive model to 
examine if producers of methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE) engaged in limit pricing to 
prohibit growth of ethanol as a gasoline additive. They find support for this hypothesis, 
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concluding that the U.S. ethanol industry is vulnerable to the import of less expensive 
sugarcane-based ethanol. Elobeid et al. (2007) provide the first comprehensive model of 
the bioeconomy, and later Tokgoz et al. (2007) fill some gaps associated with the first 
article, including work on the equilibrium prices of co-products of the biofuel industries, 
most importantly distillers grains. 
The latter two studies use a world agricultural model from the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) to determine the potential size of the 
corn-based ethanol sector and describe how it will affect crop and livestock markets. The 
authors assume that investment in each biofuel sector will occur until expected profit is 
zero. They do so by calculating the break-even corn prices that drive margins on new 
corn-based ethanol plants to zero and then simply assume that this corn price will be the 
market-clearing price. They then calculate the size of the biofuel sector that drives the 
market to this price and evaluate the impact of this break-even corn price on U.S. and 
world agriculture. The use of this market-clearing corn price allows them to decouple 
decisions made at the farm from those in the rest of the economy. They ignore biofuels 
from cellulose and biodiesel because the model results suggest that these are not 
economically viable. They also ignore risks associated with investments in biofuel plants. 
Our model enhances the literature by incorporating awareness of risk into the 
investor’s decision problem. Returns to biofuel production are uncertain because of 
variability in crop yields and also in the crude oil price, which determines the price of 
gasoline, ethanol, and other transportation fuels. By incorporating the stochastic nature of 
these variables into the model, we can compare the endogenous risk-adjusted return to 
different types of biofuel production and determine which will be attractive to investors. 
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Accounting for risk-adjusted returns is more realistic, and a stochastic model delivers 
probability distributions over future commodity prices and returns of the biofuel industry. 
In addition, we model the bioeconomy in a general equilibrium framework, allowing us 
to consider an array of issues such as the link between the market prices for biofuel 
feedstocks and risk-adjusted investment decisions that are not appropriate in a partial 
equilibrium setting such as that used in the Elobeid et al. and Tokgoz et al. studies. To the 
best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to model the interaction between the U.S. 
energy and agricultural sectors in a theoretically consistent way. 
The Economy 
The economy we model consists of farmers; agricultural commodity demanders, who will 
use the commodity as an input either in producing food or energy; and investors, who can 
choose among four different investment alternatives. An investor can choose to invest in 
a corn ethanol plant, a biodiesel plant, a cellulosic ethanol plant, or simply choose to 
invest in the “market portfolio.” The collective actions of these investors will affect 
future commodity demand but not current demand, as the plants take time to build and 
come online. We recognize that as technology advances, cellulosic biomass may be 
converted into another form of biofuel, such as butanol. However, for the purpose of this 
study, we consider cellulosic material being converted into ethanol since this is the best 
information we have at this time. Fundamental uncertainty in the economy comes 
through uncertainty in agricultural commodity yields and crude oil prices. We assume 
these two random variables are independent with joint probability distribution 
( ) ( ) ( ),t t t tf g hζ ε ζ ε= , where tζ  is a vector of yield realizations, and tε  is the 
realization of crude oil prices. Assuming independence of commodity yields and crude 
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oil prices is equivalent to assuming that domestic biofuel production will not influence 
world crude oil prices. These variables produce uncertainty in agricultural commodity 
prices, returns to biofuel production, and in other energy prices such as that of gasoline, 
diesel, ethanol, and biodiesel. The timeline of decisions in the economy, as shown in 
figure 1, unfolds as follows. At time zero, governmental policy on taxes and subsidies are 
set, the biofuel capacity currently existing is known, and agents within the economy have 
beliefs about the distributions of crude oil prices and crop yields into the future. At time 
period one, investors plan biofuel expansion or contraction. Many years elapse between 
time periods one and two, with farmers making crop allocation decisions each year. 
These allocation decisions are driven by maximization of expected profits, rotational 
constraints, and land scarcity. The decisions show some interesting cyclical patterns, as 
farmers tend to favor soybeans in years following years in which a large number of corn 
acres are grown. We need these annual decisions because we calibrate the model to actual 
market data for late 2007. However, the results are not otherwise useful because the 
economically relevant interactions occur after plants are built, and this can take several 
years. Therefore, we do not present results for these intermediate years, and we allow 
time period two to represent the long-run equilibrium in our model.  
Commodity Supply 
Production of agricultural commodities incurs crop-specific costs and affects soil fertility 
the following year. The crops available are heterogeneous in their intertemporal effects 
on soil productivity; some enhance soil fertility while some degrade it. Producers weigh 
the benefit of continuously planting high-value crops, such as corn, against the cost of 
 6 
 
decreased soil fertility in the next planting season. In addition, expected harvest-time 
price plays a crucial role in agricultural supply.  
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, producers form expectations about the 
current season’s aggregate production level, and harvest-time price for each crop. The 
actions of producers, therefore, cause the production and harvest-time prices to be noisy 
realizations of their ex-ante expected values (Muth 1961). Eckstein (1984) develops a 
dynamic model in which producers make land allocation decisions in each period and the 
equilibrium is defined by rational expectations of the agents. Eckstein’s model 
incorporates past land allocation decisions into the production functions, and uses 
dynamic programming to determine the path of equilibrium land allocations and price 
vectors. Several empirical models have borrowed from the basic structure of Eckstein’s 
work (Aradhyula and Holt 1989; Orazem and Miranowski 1994; Tegene et al. 1988). 
Many other articles consider problems that focus on allocating acreage heterogeneous in 
productivity (Wu and Adams 2001). We model commodity supply in the spirit of both 
Eckstein and Muth, because scarcity of land is a factor we cannot overlook as we are 
thinking about the potential of the biofuel industries.  
In the model, there exists a single representative competitive producer who has an 
endowment of one unit of land. This unit of land is representative of the productivity of 
U.S. cropland in terms of its yield potential and its rotational constraints. The producer 
takes both output prices and a cost function as given. Output prices and yields are 
uncertain, but all agents in the economy know the joint distribution among prices and 
yields. Faced with these, the producer allocates his land in the beginning of the period to 
three different crops, corn, soybeans, and switchgrass, in each period t. We could give the 
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farmer the ability to plant miscanthus and qualitatively the results would remain the 
same; only the magnitude of the impact of land-intensive cellulosic crop production 
would change. We chose switchgrass, in part, because we have scenarios in which 
cellulosic biofuel production is not viable, and it is easy to imagine a market for 
switchgrass in the absence of biofuel production. It simply would be marketed as hay for 
cattle consumption. Miscanthus currently has no such alternative use. We index the crops 
as follows: corn, i = 1; soybeans, i = 2; and switchgrass, i = 3. In period t, the producer’s 
profit is given by 
 
3 3
1
1 1
( , , ) ( )t t t tt i i ij it i ij
i j
w p Q s cπ ζ π−
= =
= −∑∑  
 
where tip  is crop i’s output price in time t. The quantity produced of crop i is ( )iQ ⋅ . The 
state variable, 1t−s , imposes a yield penalty associated with continuous cropping 
practices. The nominal cost function for crop i is ( );i i ic π Θ , where iΘ  is a vector of 
parameters defining each crop’s nominal cost function. Thus, it does not account for the 
opportunity cost of the land. The proportion of land allocated to crop i at time t that was 
in crop j last year is tijπ . Crop yields are a function of the crop planted last year, the 
proportion of land endowment in crop i, and time, in addition to a random error term. 
Production technology is characterized by 0it
ij
cπ∂ >∂ . The producer is risk neutral in profit, 
and thus wishes to maximize the present value of current and future expected profit 
subject to land constraints. To this end, she chooses a sequence of land allocation vectors, 
{ }
1
t
i
π ∞= , to solve her problem: 
 8 
 
 { }
[ ]
0 1 1
max . . 1 1, 2,...
t
n n
t t
t ij
t i j
E w s t t
π
β π∞
= = =
∑ ∑ ∑ = ∀ =
 
 ( )11 2 3 ,t t t ti i i i i tπ π π π −+ + = ∀  
 ( )1 2 3 ,t t t ti i i i i tπ π π π+ + = ∀  
 ( )0       , ,tij i j tπ ≥ ∀  
 
0    givenijπ  
and where 
11 21 31
12 22 32
13 23 33
.
t t t
t t t t
t t t
π π π
π π π π
π π π
⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 
The total proportion of crop i planted in time t is tiπ . We can best think of the constraints 
as a mechanism accounting for the law of motion of the land allocations. The necessary 
conditions for optimality follow. 
Euler Equations: 
1 11 11 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
0
1
: t t t ti i i ii t it t t t t t t t
j j ij ij j j ijij
t
ij t
Q c Q cQ c Q cp p E p p
i
E βπ π π π π π πππ
+ +
+ + + +
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎜ ⎟∂⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦ ⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
≠
− + + − + − + + − =     
 
11 11 1 1
1 11 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1t t t ti i i it i i tt t t t t t t t
ij ij ij ij j j j j
Q c Q c Q c Q cE p p E p p iβ βπ π π π π π π π+ ++ + + +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ≠⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
− + − = − + −      
 
These necessary conditions require the producer to equate the marginal net benefit 
of growing soybeans (switchgrass) to the marginal benefit of growing corn. The marginal 
benefit is realized through the crop’s marginal contribution to utility this period and the 
next time period. The contribution to next period’s utility is through the benefits of crop 
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rotation on next period’s yield. There are nine Euler equations in nine unknowns. Given 
our assumptions about production technology and preferences, we are guaranteed a 
solution to the farmer’s acreage allocation problem, and we can solve for a farmer’s 
expected utility maximizing acreage allocation decisions. After substituting these acreage 
allocation decisions into the production functions, we recover the period t commodity 
supplies for each crop given the random yield shock, tζ . Notice from the Euler equations 
that both price and the nominal cost of producing other crops are important in 
determining a crops supply function: 
( ) ( )3, 1 1 *
1
; , , .t s t t t t t ti ij i ij
j
Q s sζ ζ π− −
=
Θ = ⋅∑p   
 
This function is upward sloping in both the proportion of land allocated to a specific crop 
and to output in aggregate. This separation allows for easier parameterization of the 
model. 
Commodity Demand 
Demand for agricultural commodities comes from two primary sources, food and energy. 
The commodities are used as food through utilization as animal feed and for direct human 
consumption in the form of vegetable oils or cereal grains. Additionally, they are used to 
create biofuels (ethanol or biodiesel). We do not specify the optimization problem in 
these sectors; we only consider a reduced-form aggregate demand function for each 
commodity, which captures demand derived from both food uses and energy uses. We 
assume, though, that aggregate demands for the commodities are the result of many 
competitive firms in these sectors maximizing profits using the commodities as inputs in 
their production processes. Demand for commodity i in period t is given by ( ), ,t d t ti iQ np  , 
 10 
 
and is a function of the stochastic vector of current commodity prices, tp , and the 
number of biofuel plants tin  in operation at time t. We assume the aggregate demand for 
each commodity, i, has the expected properties, ( ), , 0
i
t d t t
i iQ n
p
∂ <∂
p
 and 
( ), ,
0
t d t t
i i
i
Q n
n
∂ >∂
p
. 
We do not make a priori assumptions about the sign of the cross-price derivatives in the 
conceptual model. It is conceivable for the commodities to be either substitutes or 
complements, especially with respect to livestock feed, and we leave this to be 
established in an empirical specification later. Since biofuel plants take time to build and 
come online, the number of plants in existence for a given crop year is fixed. Hence, the 
current year’s demand curve for these commodities is fixed and known to all agents in 
the economy for given yield shock realizations and past crude oil price realizations. 
Later, when we implement the model, we will specify functional forms for the demand 
equations. 
The Investors 
The final agents of note in our economy are the potential investors in biofuel plants. 
There is an obvious connection between investors and agents demanding agricultural 
commodities, but it will be useful to model their behavior independently. In each period, 
investors can choose among four different investments: a corn ethanol plant, a biodiesel 
plant, a switchgrass ethanol plant, or in a market portfolio.1 The market portfolio 
alternative is a portfolio of S&P 500 stocks, which gives the investor an option if none of 
the biofuel investments seems attractive. At the beginning of each period, investors select 
one of the investments. If an investor chooses to build a biofuel plant, it will not come 
online until the end of the period.  
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We wish to examine the behavior of a rational investor and determine the market 
conditions under which each biofuel sector will expand. We assume investors seek the 
largest risk-adjusted return on investment possible, and there exists a riskless asset in the 
economy returning RFR, the risk-free rate. The investors use the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model (CAPM) to evaluate investment alternatives (Sharpe 1964). The investors 
calculate the security market line to give a measure of the expected (required) rate of 
return for an asset, a: 
( ) a a MRequired Return RFR R RFRβ= + −  
where M is the market portfolio, MR  is the expected return of the market portfolio, 2Mσ  is 
the variance of market portfolio returns, aR  is the return of asset a, and 
( )
2
,a M
a
M
Cov R Rβ σ= . Armed with estimates of these parameters, an investor can calculate 
the difference in expected return and required return of asset a as calculated with the 
CAPM. The rational investor chooses the project with the highest excess returns over the 
required return. However, if the difference is negative for each of the biofuel plants, an 
investor will choose to invest in the market portfolio.  
Returns to Biofuel Production 
Input costs in each sector are determined by feedstock costs and other production and 
capital costs. We do not consider technological advancement in the production of 
biofuels. We take technology as given and consider how the bioeconomy will develop 
over time. Therefore, non-feedstock production costs and capital costs are exogenous in 
the model. Feedstock costs are the most important input cost to biofuel production, and 
these are determined by market equilibrium. The per gallon annual rate of return to 
 12 
 
producing biofuel of type a is 
( )
( )a
t t
a
t
a
R
q
k
ε
ζ= , where ( )t taq ε  is the effective price received 
by the plant for its product, which is the market price plus any subsidy, such as the 
blenders tax credit. The market price is a function of the crude oil price realization, tε . 
The per gallon cost of producing biofuel of type a is ( )tak ζ , which includes both 
feedstock and non-feedstock production costs. Hence, the rate of return depends on the 
yield realization in that year as well as the acreage allocation decisions of farmers.  
Competitive Equilibrium 
In our economy, a long-run competitive equilibrium at time t is defined by 
(i)  a sequence of pricing functions ( ){ }
0
, ,t t t ti tp nζ ε
∞
=
    for 1, 2, 3i = ; 
(ii)  a sequence of agricultural commodity demand functions  ( ){ },
0
,t d t ti tQ n
∞
=
p    for 
1, 2, 3i = ; 
(iii)  a sequence of agricultural commodity supply functions ( ){ }, 1
0
, ,t s t ti tQ s t
∞−
=
p   for 
1, 2, 3i = ; 
(iv)  a sequence of investment functions  ( ){ }1 1
0
t t
i t
n
∞+ +
=
p  for  1, 2, 3i = ; 
(v)  the law of motion of land allocation 
( )1 1 11 2 3 1 2 3, , , , ,t t t t t t t tπ π π π π π π π− − − ′′ ′⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∗ = ∗ =⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦1 1 . 
Given the sequence of pricing functions, the sequence of biofuel plants in operation, crop 
yield realizations, and crude oil price realizations, commodity markets clear in each 
period. That is, ( ) ( ), * 1 , * *, , , 1, 2, 3 and t.t s t t t d t ti i iQ s t Q n i− = ∀ = ∀p p     
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We not only require that markets clear but also impose the condition that, at the margin, 
the returns of each project equal the required risk-adjusted returns as determined by the 
CAPM: 
( )
( )
( )
* *
* *
* *
,
,
,
t t
corn ethanol corn ethanol corn ethanol
t t
biodiesel biodiesel biodiesel
t t
switch ethanol switch ethanol switch ethanol
R n RR
R n RR
R n RR
=
=
=
p
p
p
 
 
 
 
where RR is the required return to the biofuel plant as determined by the CAPM. 
The zero excess return conditions ensure we have investment in each of the biofuel 
plants until the prices of feedstock (corn, soybeans, and switchgrass) are bid up to the 
point at which an investor is indifferent between investing in any of the biofuel plants and 
investing in the market portfolio. When investment in one or more plants cannot meet 
this condition, then investment equals zero.  
Implementing the Model 
Our question is empirical in nature. The incentives present for the biofuel industry to 
expand or contract depend upon many factors, including the price of crude oil, demand 
for corn and soybeans for food uses, and weather variability. Exploring more than the 
most basic results of this model requires us to specify functional forms and evaluate the 
results numerically via the Monte Carlo method.2 The model starts with the month of 
December 2007 when producers of corn, soybeans, and switchgrass (hay) were planning 
how they would allocate acres in the 2008 cropping season.  
Our strategy for simulating the economy is to specify functional forms for both 
agricultural commodity supply and demand and to calibrate the distribution of crude oil 
prices and commodity yields at specified dates in the future. A joint draw from these 
distributions implies an equilibrium price for corn, soybeans, and switchgrass and thus 
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implies return levels in each biofuel industry.  
Commodity Supply 
We parameterize the production function for the agricultural commodities as 
( ) 31 1 *
1
, , , , 1, 2,3t t t t t ti ij i ij
j
Q p s t s i jζ ζ π− −
=
= ∀ =∑    
where 1ts −  is the yield penalty associated with continuous cropping practices. We impose 
a yield penalty only for continuous corn rotations.3 We draw from the joint beta 
distribution of yields,   
1, , ,
t
corn
t t t t
soybean max min
t
switchgrass
μ
ζ β μ
μ
−
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟Σ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
q q ∼
 
3843.83 1.99 ,    99.52 .52 ,    13.94 .0086t t tcorn soybean switchgrasst t tμ μ μ= − + = − + = − +  
1
max
3228.08 39.71 1.58
39.71 10.83 0.312 ,  3 ,  
1.58 0.312 0.031 3
t
corn corn
t t
soybean soybean
t
switchgrass switchgrass
μ σ
μ σ
μ σ
−
⎡ ⎤+⎡ ⎤ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Σ = = +⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
q
 
min
2
2 ,
2
t
corn corn
t t
soybean soybean
t
switchgrass switchgrass
μ σ
μ σ
μ σ
⎡ ⎤−⎢ ⎥= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥−⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
q  
using the algorithm developed by Magnussen (2004). The mean of this joint distribution 
follows a linear trend through time, which was estimated from historical yield data for 
years 1980 through 2006 maintained by the National Agricultural Statistics Service.4 The 
matrix 1−Σ  is the variance-covariance matrix for the yields of the three crops. We assume 
the nominal total cost functions of the agricultural commodities are quadratic, given by 
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( ) ( )2t t ti ij i i i ic aπ π κ π= +  1, 2, 3i∀ = . We use estimates of U.S. annual supply 
elasticities for each crop from FAPRI’s agricultural outlook model. Using these elasticity 
estimates, we can solve for the iκ  parameters. We calibrate the intercepts, ia , so that the 
model matches current market conditions. Motivation for upward-sloping marginal cost 
curves is that as land becomes more concentrated in a certain crop, costs will rise because 
of the need to invest in additional pest control and nutrient inputs.  
Commodity Demand 
We specify a simple, constant elasticity, reduced-form demand function for each 
commodity. We use the intermediate-term own- and cross-price demand elasticities for 
beef from the Economic Research Service/Penn State World Trade Organization model 
as our estimates of the , , 1 2 3
i i iα α α . The price distribution of crude oil influences 
commodity demands indirectly through the number of biofuel plants of each type in the 
economy; in our simulation, crude oil prices are lognormal and calibrated to match 
current conditions in the futures market:5,6 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 3 40 1 2 3, , 1, 2, 3.i i i id t t t i t t t ti i iQ n p p p n iα α α αε α= ∀ =p      
One of the equilibrium conditions requires the number of biofuel plants in each 
industry to be such that there are no excess returns over the required return. The 
parameter 4
iα  is simply an elasticity measuring the percentage change in quantity 
demanded over the percentage change in the number of plants when an additional plant is 
built. To calculate 4
iα , we assume that all plants of a given type are homogeneous in 
capacity7 and that while online they run at full capacity. Using these parameterizations of 
commodity supply and demand, as shown in table 1, and making draws from the joint 
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yield and crude price distribution, we can solve for equilibrium commodity prices and 
determine the distribution of returns to each kind of biofuel plant. 
Accounting for Cellulosic Ethanol from Corn Stover and Wood Chips  
If switchgrass ethanol is commercially viable, then presumably cellulosic ethanol produced 
from corn stover and wood chips will be commercially viable. This is because these 
biomass sources do not compete directly for acres from high-value crops such as corn and 
soybeans and thus would not have as large an implicit land cost. Because production of 
these feedstocks occurs outside the framework of our model, we need to make some 
assumptions about how much ethanol will be produced from these sources. In the case of 
viable switchgrass ethanol, we assume that ethanol from both corn stover and woody 
biomass is produced also. While it is uncertain how much corn stover realistically will be 
collected, and how much wood chips will be available for biofuel production, we have to 
make some assumption in order to simulate the model. For example, if stover is utilized at 
a 25% removal rate, and corn stover mass is produced in a ratio of 1:1 with corn grain 
mass, then 5.45 billion gallons of ethanol will be produced from corn stover (Blanco-
Canqui and Lal 2007; Graham et al. 2007). Further, six billion gallons of biofuel produced 
from wood chips or other woody residue sources may be a reasonable expectation given the 
“billion ton” study by Perlack et al. (2005). Note that in this example 4.54 billion gallons 
per year must come from switchgrass ethanol or other land-intensive biomass sources to 
meet the cellulosic mandate in the EISA Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). Since it remains 
unclear exactly how cellulosic biofuel will come into existence, we also present after the 
section containing the main results a sensitivity analysis varying the amount of cellulosic 
ethanol that must come from switchgrass ethanol.  
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Calculating Returns to Biofuel Production 
The forces most affecting returns to biofuel production are feedstock costs and 
governmental policy. Feedstock costs are determined endogenously within the model; 
corn and switchgrass are fed directly into the ethanol and cellulosic ethanol plants. For 
biodiesel, soy oil (not soybeans directly) is the feedstock. Our model produces 
equilibrium soybean prices but not soy oil prices. We estimate a simple linear 
relationship between the price of soybeans and the price of soy oil using recent data:8 
Soy Oil Price = 0.044 * Soybean Price − .009   2 0.878R =  
Each type of biofuel produces a co-product that generates value that can offset 
some of the feedstock cost. Corn ethanol produces dried distillers grains, dried distillers 
grains with solubles (DDGS), or wet distillers grains, which are used in beef, pork, and 
poultry rations in limited quantities. These co-products substitute for corn and soybean 
meal in livestock rations. Therefore, the price of DDGS moves with the prices of corn 
and soybean meal. Distillers grains have approximately the same digestible energy 
content as corn, so here we give a credit to corn ethanol plants for DDGS consistent with 
its ability to substitute for corn in livestock rations (Shurson et al. 2003). The biodiesel 
production process yields glycerin, fatty acids, and filter cakes. We credit 8¢ per gallon to 
the biodiesel producer based on the current market value for these co-products (Paulson 
and Ginder 2007).  
Production of ethanol from switchgrass produces lignin, which is combustible and 
will be used to generate electricity within the facility or will be sold back to the electrical 
grid (Aden et al. 2002). We credit switchgrass ethanol with 10¢ per gallon as suggested 
in Aden et al. (2002). The per gallon non-feedstock costs of producing corn-based 
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ethanol and cellulosic ethanol are 76¢ per gallon and 97¢ per gallon, respectively, while 
the non-feedstock cost of producing biodiesel is 55¢ per gallon (Paulson and Ginder 
2007; Tokgoz et al. 2007). 
Revenue realized by biofuel plants relates directly to crude oil prices. For 
simplicity, we assume that the price of ethanol and diesel are deterministic linear 
functions of the price of crude oil. We used monthly spot prices from January 1994 
through August 2007 of the Cushing Oklahoma crude oil, New York Harbor 
conventional gasoline, and U.S. No. 2 wholesale/resale markets to estimate the linear 
relationship: 9   
Wholesale Gasoline Price = 0.21+2.84*Crude Oil Price    
2 0.97R =  
4.00 3.13*Wholesale Diesel Price CrudeOil Price= − +     2 0.98R =  
E10 is the term given to a 10% ethanol, 90% gasoline blend. E85 refers to an 85% 
ethanol, 15% gasoline blend. E10 blend ethanol is utilized for its ability to oxygenate 
gasoline, which enhances combustion and reduces emissions (NSTC, 1997). E85 blend 
ethanol is currently used only in flex-fuel vehicles that have been specially designed to 
withstand the corrosive properties of alcohol-based fuel. Ethanol has about two-thirds the 
energy value of gasoline (Shapouri et al. 1995).  
Following Tokgoz et al. (2007), we assume based on the demand-side model that 
when annual production is greater than 14 billion gallons per year, the E10 market 
becomes saturated, causing ethanol to be priced at the margin according to its energy 
value compared to gasoline. When production is below this threshold, we assume that 
ethanol is priced at a premium to gasoline, valued for its properties as an additive (Hurt et 
al. 2006). To account for this transition in ethanol pricing, we interpolate between the 
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additive and energy value pricing rules, as follows: 
( )( )
1.05*                              if  14  
1.05 .667 1 *  if 14   16   
.667*                              if 
gasoline
ethanol gasoline
gasoline
P ethanol production bil gal
P P bil gal ethanol production bil gal
P et
λ λ
<
= + − < <
 16   hanol production bil gal
⎧⎪⎨⎪ >⎩
 
where 14
16 14
ethanol productionλ −= − . 
We are ignoring short-term distribution-related bottlenecks because market forces 
will reward those who solve these localized problems. There is a much more serious 
bottleneck that occurs once all gasoline contains a 10% blend. To go past this point, 
ethanol needs to sell below its energy value to incentivize the sale of 85% blends. This 
new price is substantially below that which can be charged when ethanol is being used as 
an oxygenate, and the need for this price change cannot be eliminated by the construction 
of new infrastructure. Returns to biofuel production are calculated and compared to the 
required return as defined by the CAPM. There will be entry (exit) into a biofuel sector 
until the excess returns over the required return are eliminated. Since we are interested in 
long-run equilibrium, we solve for the number of biofuel plants in the crop year 
consistent with this condition.  
Limitations of the Model 
Before we present the results, we should discuss some limitations of the model.The 
assumptions that allow the model to be run both in terms of relationships in the data and 
the behavior of participants represent a simplification of true market conditions that 
currently exist and that are likely to exist in the future. The results we present should be 
interpreted with this limitation in mind. 
International trade is not present in our model. Currently there is a $0.54-per-
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gallon specific tariff and a 2.5% ad valorem tariff on imported ethanol, which effectively 
limits the importation of Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol. These tariffs could be 
removed, or adoption of cost-reducing advances in sugarcane-based ethanol might make 
Brazilian ethanol attractive even with the import tariffs in place. If either of these 
situations were to happen, an international sector would need to be added to the model in 
order to understand fully the domestic bioeconomy. 
The model adjusts to long-run equilibrium whereby the number of biofuel plants in 
each sector is such that none earns excess returns over the required return. This is clearly not 
the way the industry would evolve in reality; the transitions would be gradual and carried out 
over a number of years, and the industry might possibly overshoot the equilibrium outcome. 
While consideration of these factors would add some realism to the model, it would also add 
a level of complexity not required to address our questions of interest. 
Results 
There are two forces that can significantly affect the evolution of the biofuel industry: 
governmental policy and energy prices. We simulate what long-run equilibrium in the 
bioeconomy would look like under different scenarios regarding biofuel tax credits, 
biofuel production mandates, and crude oil prices. To establish a baseline against which 
we can compare different scenarios, we simulate the model using pre-EISA governmental 
policies. That is, we include the Volumetric Ethanol Excise Tax Credit from the 
American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, which includes a $0.51-per-gallon credit for 
ethanol, and a $1.00-per-gallon credit to biodiesel. We also use current expectations of 
future crude oil prices. As a proxy for this, we use the mean of the daily NYMEX 
December 2008 contract price for crude oil during October 2007, which is $78.63. The 
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baseline case includes an existing corn ethanol industry with a capacity of 6.8 billion 
gallons per year, a biodiesel industry with a capacity of 1.2 billion gallons per year, and 
no cellulosic ethanol industry in 2007.10,11  
The baseline results (table 2) show sustained high commodity prices and 
persistence in corn-intensive cropping patterns. The corn ethanol sector expands until 
total production exceeds 18 billion gallons per year. Biodiesel and cellulosic ethanol from 
switchgrass are not viable in this scenario. Cellulosic ethanol never expands, and the 
biodiesel sector contracts so that there are no biodiesel plants operating in the long run. 
These results suggest that under pre-EISA policy, once the opportunity cost of land is 
taken into account, rational farmers will not grow switchgrass or soybeans for biofuel 
production, and rational investors will not build these plants. In our results, the biodiesel 
industry disappears at pre-EISA subsidy levels. So, why does the current biodiesel 
industry exist? Biodiesel production continues to expand every year (Westcott 2007) 
despite the fact that the biodiesel industry is not producing at capacity (Radich 2004), and 
potential for profit looks grim as the industry continues to face high soybean prices. 
Perhaps biodiesel producers were counting on a successful lobbying effort that would 
secure higher subsidies for biodiesel relative to corn ethanol; this strategy proved quite 
rational after the passage of the EISA. 
Renewable Fuel Standard Scenarios  
In the remaining scenarios, we impose the biofuel production levels indicated by the new 
RFS in the EISA of 2007 and consider the bioeconomy’s equilibrium outcomes for three 
different long-run crude oil price scenarios. We assume that the greenhouse gas reduction 
requirements in the legislation are met for all biofuels. After imposing the biofuel 
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production levels, our model allows us to solve for the level of subsidy (tax credit) 
required to maintain the zero-excess-return condition in addition to delivering 
equilibrium agricultural commodity prices and acreage allocations. Corn has a mean 
long-run equilibrium price of $4.76 per bushel, soybeans, $13.01 per bushel, and 
switchgrass, $164.62 per ton. Long-run equilibrium acreage allocations are 61% of acres 
in corn, 19% in soybeans, and 20% in switchgrass or hay.  
The variable we are interested in comparing across different crude oil price 
scenarios is the level of tax credit required to maintain the no-excess-return conditions 
(see table 3). We cannot say, a priori, whether high crude oil prices will imply higher or 
lower zero-excess-return tax credit levels. Crude oil prices act on biofuel returns in two 
ways. Most obviously, high crude oil prices imply high biofuel prices, positively 
affecting returns to biofuel production. In addition, high crude oil prices affect returns to 
biofuel production in the following way. Consider the returns to biodiesel production. 
Biodiesel benefits from high crude oil prices by the resulting strong output prices it 
enjoys, but so does corn ethanol, and switchgrass ethanol. This creates more intense 
competition for acreage among the energy crops, and results in higher commodity prices. 
This price increase reduces the return to each kind of biofuel production. Without 
simulating the model, we cannot determine which effect will be stronger.    
Land allocations, under the EISA RFS, shift toward the crops whose derived fuels 
are mandated at a high level. Incentives provided to the “greener” fuels diffuse through 
the economy and cause a shift in land allocation patterns. The mandate results in much 
higher commodity prices than in the baseline. If the cellulosic mandates in the act are 
designed to avoid the feed-versus-fuel trade-off, our results suggest it will actually 
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exacerbate the situation by inducing even higher feedstuff costs than under the regime 
with only corn ethanol in production. With a fixed amount of land, it is impossible to 
increase the amount of each crop devoted to energy and maintain the same level of 
consumption of each commodity for food uses such as feeding livestock.  
Sensitivity of Results to Required Levels of Switchgrass Production 
The amount of cellulosic biofuel production that is feasible from corn stover and woody 
biomass is uncertain. This amount could be a significant factor in determining long-run 
commodity prices and acreage allocation patterns because the amount of cellulosic 
biofuel not covered by corn stover and woody biomass will need to be made up with 
land-intensive biomass crops such as switchgrass. The more land-intensive biomass crops 
are needed to meet the cellulosic ethanol requirements, the greater the intensity of 
competition for acreage.  
 Table 4 presents the results of several scenarios increasing the amount of 
switchgrass ethanol needed to meet the new RFS. In the first scenario, we consider the 
case in which the new RFS for cellulosic ethanol can be met exclusively with corn stover 
and woody residue, and no land-intensive biomass is needed. Note that we calculate that 
the subsidy given to cellulosic ethanol (including corn stover and wood chip ethanol) 
must reach $0.90 per gallon before the switchgrass ethanol sector would begin to expand. 
The final scenario requiring 10.55 billion gallons of switchgrass ethanol per year is 
arithmetically equivalent to assuming 25% of corn stover will be collected for ethanol 
and there is no production of ethanol from wood chips. With increasing requirements on 
land-intensive biofuel, we see higher commodity prices and higher subsidy levels needed 
to maintain the required biofuel industry sizes. The sensitivity analysis is also useful in 
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that it hints at how the results might have been different had we simulated the model with 
miscanthus instead of switchgrass as the dominant cellulosic biomass crop. 
Conclusions 
Our results lead to some general conclusions about the future of biofuels in the United 
States. Competition for land ensures that providing an incentive to just one crop will 
increase equilibrium prices of all. Also, at pre-EISA subsidy levels, neither biodiesel nor 
switchgrass ethanol is commercially viable in the long run. In order for switchgrass 
ethanol to be commercially viable, it must receive a differential subsidy over that 
awarded to corn-based ethanol. Homogeneous subsidy levels for all types of ethanol 
cannot entice expansion of switchgrass ethanol. Since switchgrass competes for the same 
acres as corn, and corn-based ethanol is less expensive to produce, corn-based ethanol 
will always have a comparative advantage over switchgrass ethanol in the absence of a 
differential subsidy. 
 Corn and soybeans compete for the same acreage, so when energy prices are such 
that corn-based ethanol is stimulated, then the price of soybeans must also increase if the 
farmer is to continue to allocate some land to soybeans. This increase in soybean prices 
reduces the profitability of biodiesel even in scenarios in which energy prices are high. 
This means that under pre-EISA subsidy levels, the soy oil biodiesel sector is not viable 
under any energy price considered. If the EISA mandates are to be met in a voluntary 
fashion, then the biodiesel sector will require a higher relative subsidy than it has today. 
 We calculate the subsidies required to stimulate biofuel production to the levels 
required by the EISA RFS. We find that subsidy levels are needed in the range of $0.22 
to $0.78 per gallon for corn ethanol, $1.97 to $2.90 per gallon for biodiesel, and $1.55 to 
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$2.11 for cellulosic ethanol. Crude oil price realizations in the future will determine the 
subsidy levels required to maintain industry sizes required by the new RFS. The new RFS 
results in much higher commodity prices than in the baseline. This suggests that the 
cellulosic mandates in the EISA that appear designed to avoid the feed-versus-fuel trade-
off may actually exacerbate the situation relative to a situation in which corn-based 
ethanol is allowed to expand. Cellulosic ethanol is more expensive to produce, and 
switchgrass-based ethanol is more land intensive than corn-based ethanol. Therefore, the 
severity of upward pressure on commodity prices caused by the new RFS will be 
determined largely by the ability to produce cellulosic ethanol from biomass that is not 
land intensive to produce. Policies that expand cellulosic ethanol beyond levels that can 
be supplied by corn stover and woody biomass are therefore more expensive in terms of 
the subsidy that is required and the resulting increase in food and feed prices that result. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 We consider only corn, soybeans, and switchgrass because we focus on the decision of a farmer who must 
allocate crop ground. Other cellulosic feedstocks such as woodchips are not well suited to crop ground 
(Lewandowski et al. 2003).  
2 All simulations were conducted in Matlab. 
3 We assume a 10% yield drag on continuous corn rotations. 
4 This is given in per harvested acre. We use alfalfa as a proxy for switchgrass yields, since the tonnage per 
acre is approximately equivalent to the switchgrass yields projected in the literature. See 
http://www.nass.usda.gov/. 
5 The prices of other fuels (e.g., gasoline and biodiesel) are based on their relationship to crude oil prices. 
6 Implied volatility in crude oil prices is estimated from 2007 option data. In the first scenario we take as 
the mean of the crude oil price distributions in each period to be the NYMEX price of the December futures 
contract in the relevant year on October 2, 2007. In a subsequent scenario, we increase the crude oil futures 
price to reflect the dramatic increase in oil prices that occurred between October 2007 and December 2007. 
7 We assume corn ethanol plant capacity is 53.05 mgy, biodiesel plant capacity is 20 mgy, and cellulosic 
ethanol plant capacity is 51.1 mgy. Corn ethanol and biodiesel capacity is based on capacity of current 
plants as published by the Renewable Fuels Association and the National Biodiesel Board. Cellulosic 
ethanol capacity is based on Aden et al. 2002. See http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/locations/ and 
http://www.biodiesel.org/buyingbiodiesel/producers_marketers/ProducersMap-Construction.pdf.  
8 The relationship is estimated from the daily nearest cash prices on the CBOT from October 17, 2005 to 
September 14, 2007. 
9 Historical data are maintained at http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm.  
10 For existing ethanol industry capacity and locations, see http://www.ethanolrfa.org/industry/locations/ 
(September 2007). 
11 For existing biodiesel industry capacity and locations, see 
http://www.biodiesel.org/buyingbiodiesel/producers_marketers/ProducersMap-Existing.pdf (September 
2007). 
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Table 1. Parameters Used in Monte Carlo Simulation 
 
iκ  ia  0iα  1iα  2iα  3iα  4iα  
Corn 0.112  9 −0.258 0.002 0 0.19 
Soybeans 1.54 −56.99 6 0.081 −0.379 0 0.26 
Switchgrass 221.64 −0.785 1.2 0 0 −0.16 0.06 
 
 
Table 2. Assumptions in the Baseline Scenario 
 Corn Biodiesel Switchgrass   
2007 Biofuel industry sizes 
(billion gallons) 6.8  1.2  0   
2007 Acreage proportionsa 0.50 0.30 0.20   
Tax credits ($/gal) $0.51 $1.00 $0.51   
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Current expectation of future 
crude prices ($/barrel) $78.63 $78.63 $78.63 $78.63 $78.63 
a From NASS (http://www.nass.usda.gov/index.asp). 
 31 
 
 
Table 3. Long-Run Results under Different Tax Credits, RFS Mandate, and Crude 
Oil Price Scenarios 
 Baseline 
New RFS 
Mid Crude  
New RFS 
High Crude  
New RFS 
Low Crude  
[ ]crudeE p ($/barrel) $78.63 $78.63 $95 $65 
[ ]cornE p  ($/bu) $4.29 $4.76 $4.76 $4.76 
[ ]sbE p  ($/bu) $11.37 $13.01 $13.01 $13.01 
[ ]sgE p  ($/ton) $141.47 $164.62 164.62 $164.62 
Land allocations 
( )1 2 3  π π π  (.65  .19  .16) (.61  .19  .20) (.61  .19  .20) (.61 .19  .20) 
Corn ethanol 
production 
(billion gallons) 
18.5 15 15 15 
Biodiesel 
productiona 
(billion gallons) 
0bgy 1 1 1 
Switchgrass 
ethanol production 
(billion gallons) 
0 4.55 4.55 4.55 
Tax credit  
Corn ethanol 
($/gal) 
$0.51 $0.53 $0.22 $0.78 
Tax credit–
biodiesel 
($/gal) 
$1.00 $2.49 $1.97 $2.90 
Tax credit–
cellulosic 
ethanol 
($/gal) 
$0.51 $1.86 $1.55 $2.11 
Note: Shaded portions are exogenous in the scenario. 
aProduction from soy oil feedstock. 
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Table 4. Sensitivity of Crop Prices and Required Subsidy Levels to Increasing 
Switchgrass Ethanol Levels 
 
New RFS  
Mid Crude 
New RFS  
Mid Crude 
New RFS 
Mid Crude 
New RFS 
Mid Crude 
[ ]crudeE p ($/barrel) $78.63 $78.63 $78.63 $78.63 
[ ]cornE p  ($/bu) $3.98 $4.66 $4.83 $4.96 
[ ]sbE p  ($/bu) $10.29 $12.65 $13.25 $13.67 
[ ]sgE p  ($/ton) $127.52 $159.75 $168.05 $173.67 
Land allocations 
( )1 2 3  π π π  (.64  .20  .16) (.61  .19  .20) (.61  .19  .21) (.60  .18  .21) 
Corn ethanol 
production 
(billion gallons) 
15 15 15 15 
Biodiesel 
productiona 
(billion gallons) 
1 1 1 1 
Switchgrass 
ethanol 
production 
(billion gallons) 
0 2.55 6.55 10.55 
Tax credit–corn 
ethanol ($/gal) 0 0.49 0.55 0.58 
Tax credit–
biodiesel ($/gal) 1.54 2.34 2.59 2.72 
Tax credit–
cellulosic 
ethanol ($/gal) 
 0.90 1.77 1.92 1.99 
Note: Shaded portions are exogenous in the scenario. 
aProduction from soy oil feedstock. 
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Figure 1. Decision timeline for commodity production 
 
• Biofuel investment decisions 
take place
• Policy decisions made 
• Existing biofuel capacity known 
• Beliefs formed about future crude price 
and crop yield distributions 
• Farmers make land allocation 
decisions each year 
• Long-run crude oil prices and crop 
yields are realized 
